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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the impact on the transition to work of a policy reform in Belgium that restricted 
the access to a specific unemployment insurance scheme for young labor market entrants. This 
scheme entitles youths with no or little labor market experience to unemployment benefits after a 
waiting period of one year. As of 2015, the Belgian government unexpectedly scrapped benefit 
eligibility for youths who start the waiting period at the age of 24 or older. The reform implied a 
change from an inclining to a flat rate (zero-level) benefit profile. We use a difference-in-differences 
approach to identify the causal impact of this reform on fresh university graduates. Our main finding 
is that this reform only increases the transition to very short-lived jobs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Developed countries usually provide some form of social protection to financially support young labor 
market entrants in case they do not directly find insurable employment. In most countries this consists 
in a means-tested welfare benefit, but in some others freshly educated youths are entitled to 
unemployment insurance (UI). Such a scheme is often accompanied by strong eligibility conditions to 
contain moral hazard costs. In Australia and New Zealand UI is provided immediately upon registration 
as job seeker, but imposes very strict job search requirements. In Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg 
entitlement to UI is subject to less stringent job search obligations (Langenbucher, 2015), but is 
postponed by a waiting period.2 In Sweden, until 2007 high school graduates were entitled to 
unemployment benefits (UB) only from age 20 onwards (von Buxhoeveden, 2019). 
 
In Belgium, the focus of our analysis, there is a one-year waiting period between the time that youths 
enter the job market and the moment they become eligible for UI benefits. This aims at keeping work 
incentives high in the school-to-work transition. As of 2015, the Belgian government unexpectedly 
scrapped the entitlement to these benefits for youths who start the waiting period at the age of 24 or 
older. With an average age of graduation from master programs slightly above 24 in Belgium, this 
decision affected in particular master’s graduates. In this paper we empirically test whether this reform 
affected their work incentives within one year and a half following labor market entry. The way the 
reform has been implemented offers a unique natural experiment to study this question. The 24-year-
old graduates who registered for the first time as unemployed job seekers in 2014 were informed by 
surprise in January 2015 that they were no longer entitled to UI at the end of their waiting period. By 
contrast, graduates aged 23 at first registration in 2014 remained entitled. This therefore naturally 
allows to evaluate the effects of the reform on employment outcomes in a difference-in-differences 
approach. 
 
Before 2015, UI for young labor market entrants in Belgium displayed an unusual inclining benefit 
profile. In such a setting, work incentives are maximal at the start of the zero-benefit waiting period. 
Later on, as one approaches the end of this period, standard job search theory (Mortensen, 1977 and 
van den Berg, 1990) predicts that homogeneous forward-looking agents progressively decrease search 
effort and increase their reservation wage. These behavioral reactions result in decreasing job finding 
rates, better job matches and higher earnings. The 2015 reform that completely abolishes the 
entitlement to this inclining profile is therefore expected to reverse these predictions. Relative to the 
counterfactual of no policy reform, job finding is expected to gradually increase and the quality of 
found jobs to decrease as the end of the waiting period is approached.  
 
There is ample empirical evidence that reducing the generosity of social benefits positively impacts job 
finding and that recipients anticipate by accelerating their transitions to employment well before 
benefits exhaust (see for a survey Tatsiramos and Van Ours, 2014, or Schmieder and von Wachter, 
2016). There is, however, to the best of our knowledge, not any evidence on the impact on job finding 
of a change from an increasing profile of UI benefits to a flat rate (zero-level) benefit profile. Based on 
the arguments of Kolsrud et al. (2018), we may actually expect that such a change has only small 
positive effects on job finding rates. Dynamic sorting and negative duration dependence in job finding 
rates imply that youths who are sensitive to monetary incentives may already have left unemployment 
before the prospect of losing entitlement to UI starts to play a role on behavior. In the Belgian UI 
scheme for youth, no benefits are paid-out at the start, so that these incentives are very strong initially. 
Hence, the dynamic sorting will progress at a faster rate than in regular UI. To this can be added the 
                                                 
2 Based on age and educational attainment, young labor market entrants in Luxembourg are eligible for unemployment 
benefits after a waiting period of six months (Luxembourg Employment Agency, 2020). In Denmark, all labor market entrants 
who join an unemployment fund within two weeks after graduation can immediately obtain unemployment benefits. Those 
who register after this two-week deadline, are paid out unemployment benefits only after one year (A-Kasser, 2019). 
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predictions of the calibrated life-cycle model of Michelacci and Ruffo (2015). They conclude that moral 
hazard is less an issue for youth than for prime aged workers because the young want to be employed 
anyway as to improve life-time career prospects.  
 
Researchers have not only studied the impact of UI generosity on job finding. There is also ample but 
mixed evidence about its effect on job quality.3 Nekoei and Weber (2017) explain why it is so in the 
case of the impact of an extension of benefit duration. While an extension raises the reservation wage, 
the more selective acceptance behavior implies that individuals remain longer unemployed which in 
turn reduces job quality. This lower quality can be caused by the employers’ screening of job applicants 
based on unemployment duration (Kroft et al., 2013) or by a reduced selectivity of long-term 
unemployed as a consequence of liquidity constraints (Chetty, 2008; Card et al., 2007). The reform 
analyzed in this paper may have a similar ambiguous effect on job quality. On the one hand, the 
prospect of not qualifying for UB is likely to induce many unemployed youths to become less selective 
in their job acceptance decision. On the other hand, the reform may also induce young graduates to 
find jobs earlier in the unemployment spell when higher quality jobs are available (Lindner and Reizer, 
2019). The last channel requires, however, that the reform effectively induces youths to accelerate job 
finding early in the waiting period, which we do not expect given the length of this period. The first 
channel should therefore dominate and drive a negative effect of the reform on job quality.  
 
This is not the first study of the behavioral effects of waiting periods for UI or welfare benefits. 
However, the existing papers have focused on the effect of introducing such qualifying periods 
(Bolhaar et al., 2019) or extending their duration (Cockx and Van Belle, 2019). Other research has 
studied instead the effect on work incentives of receiving benefit payments after a period of no-pay 
status (Bargain and Doorley, 2011; von Buxhoeveden, 2019). In contrast to these studies, we 
contribute to the literature by analyzing the impact on work incentives of abolishing the entitlement 
to UI benefits when a waiting period is completed. As we will show in this study, the length of such 
period is an important determinant of employment responses to such a scheme. 
 
Our analysis uses administrative population data of all recent master’s graduates who registered for 
the first time as unemployed job seeker at the regional Public Employment Services (PES) between 
2011 and 2014. For privacy reasons we only have access to data grouped by age and period of 
registration. Since not all employment outcomes are measured in the same way across regions, the 
analysis is performed separately for the two main regions of Belgium: Flanders and Wallonia. 
Cumulative job finding rates are observed six, twelve and eighteen months after registration. The rates 
measured after six and twelve months are used to study the behavioral anticipation of the prospect of 
losing entitlement to UI, while the one measured after eighteen months allows to detect the 
(additional) ex-post effect of actually losing benefit eligibility. In Wallonia job finding includes jobs 
lasting as short as one day, while in Flanders a job transition is registered only to the extent it is still 
ongoing at the end of the month. To estimate the effect on short-lived jobs in this region, we therefore 
use an indicator of transitions to temporary help agency work (temp jobs for short) that the Flemish 
PES registers separately. Because there may be a trade-off between rapid job finding and lasting 
integration on the job market, our range of outcomes also includes the probability of being employed 
measured at the same time horizons as the job finding rate. 
 
The empirical results deliver two main messages. First, they provide clear evidence that the prospect 
of losing UI eligibility increases the transition to very short-lived jobs. In Flanders, in the absence of the 
policy reform, 9.0% (resp. 12.1%) of the 24-year-old master's graduates registered as job seekers would 
                                                 
3 Some studies find positive effects of benefit extensions in terms of wages or job stability (e.g. Tatsiramos, 2009, Centeno 
and Novo, 2009, and Nekoei and Weber, 2015). Others find negative or no effects (e.g. Lalive, 2007, Caliendo et al., 2013, 
Card et al., 2007, van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006, Le Barbanchon, 2016, and Schmieder et al., 2016). In a recent study, de 
Groot and van der Klaauw (2019) show modest negative effects of reducing the UI entitlement period on job quality. 
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have found a temp job within 6 (resp. 12) months after registration. The policy reform caused a 
significant increase of this fraction by 3.3 (3.7) percentage points. Effects of a similar order of 
magnitude are estimated in Wallonia on cumulative transitions to employment lasting at least one day, 
although less precisely. There is, however, no evidence of an additional effect of the policy reform 
when the eligibility loss has become a tangible reality, i.e. one year and a half after registration. Second, 
when we consider the effects on transitions to more stable jobs (ongoing at the end of the month) and 
on employment probabilities, the impacts are at all moments of observation small and statistically not 
significantly different from zero. In sum, our findings suggest that the reform has only accelerated 
transitions to short-term labor contracts which did not serve as a stepping stone to stable employment. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the institutional context, 
the policy reform and the natural experiment it entails. Section 3 takes a first look at our dataset and 
provides the exact definition of the employment outcomes of interest. Section 4 discusses the 
methodology and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 ends with some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Institutional framework 
 
In this section we first explain the pre-reform eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits (UB) 
targeted to people who become unemployed on leaving education. Subsequently, we discuss the 
policy reform of 2015 that is evaluated in this study.  
 
2.1. The Activation Allowance 
 
In Belgium, young labor market entrants are eligible for non-means-tested UI based on age and weak 
educational requirements. This unemployment benefit is called the “activation allowance”. It aims at 
supporting young unemployed job seekers who are or become unemployed one year after their first 
entry in the labor market and who are not eligible for regular UI benefits, because they did not 
contribute sufficiently: this requires proof of at least one year of full-time employment. The one-year 
waiting period starts either at the first registration as job seeker at the regional PES or at the start of 
the first employment spell, whichever is earlier. Once the waiting period ends, the job seeker can start 
claiming UI benefits. Before the policy reform of 2015, job seekers were entitled to the activation 
allowance if they were younger than 30 when they claimed this benefit for the first time. Even high 
school dropouts were eligible provided that they spent sufficient time in school. Periods of 
unemployment and employment reduce the waiting period, but periods of inactivity, such as sickness, 
resumed education or participation in long-lasting (i.e. > 9 months) training programs, extend it.  
 
During the waiting period, the regional PES assists the unemployed in their job search by providing 
intermediation services, counseling or training programs. The PES is also in charge of job search 
monitoring. Compared to other OECD countries, where the monitoring of job search effort often takes 
place at regular intervals (monthly or even weekly) (Langenbucher, 2015), it occurs much later and 
more infrequently in Belgium. It is only as from the 7th and 11th month of the waiting period that job 
seekers are interviewed in relation to their job search activities. To be eligible for the activation 
allowance at the end of the waiting period they must prove sufficient search effort at these two 
moments. If they do not, this period is prolonged until they do.4  
 
                                                 
4 In case of a negative evaluation by the caseworker, individuals must request to be interviewed again. This new interview is 
carried out six months after the negative evaluation, at the earliest. Nonetheless, the percentage of individuals who get a 
negative evaluation at the scheduled interviews is very small, between 4% and 8% (Onem, 2013, 2014). 
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The activation allowance is a flat rate non-means tested benefit, the level of which depends on age 
and family status. In 2015, young entrants to the labor market who live on their own without 
dependents were entitled to a monthly benefit of 818 euro above the age of 21. In Belgium, most 
unemployed youths still live with their parents (Cockx and Van Belle, 2019). In that case they were paid 
out a monthly allowance of 425 euro as cohabitant. Since January 2012, the activation allowance is 
time limited with as general rule a maximum duration of 3 years. Before 2012, there was no time limit. 
 
Individuals with insufficient income are eligible for means-tested welfare benefits. In 2015 the level of 
these benefits amounted to 556 euro per month for cohabitants and 834 euro for singles. Since the 
majority of unemployed youths who leave education continue living with their parents, they generally 
do not qualify for these welfare benefits, because the means-test applies to the household income. 
Only if they live alone (and only a minority does) or their parents have a too low income, they may 
claim these benefits. If they do, they will most likely already do so during the waiting period. In that 
case the entitlement to the activation allowance does not affect their financial resources. Even if 
figures on welfare take-up among the population targeted in our study are not known, it is likely to be 
very small. In 2011, only 2.2% of students aged 18-24 claimed welfare benefits (IDD, 2012, p. 4). 
 
2.2. The policy reform as a natural experiment 
 
On December 31 2014, the Belgian government signed an agreement to reinforce the eligibility 
conditions for the activation allowance. Officially, the aim of this reform was to cope with the perverse 
incentives of this allowance for job search incentives of youths, but the budgetary savings that came 
along with it were certainly also part of the motivation of its implementation. As of January 1 2015, 
youths aged 25 or more at the time of the first claim can no longer benefit from the activation 
allowance. Given the one-year waiting period, students must enter the labor market before their 24th 
anniversary to retain eligibility. The reform therefore changed the benefit profile from inclining to a 
flat rate one (at zero) for youths stopping to study at age 24 or older. Youths who had already started 
receiving the activation allowance before 2015 were not affected by the reform. 
 
In this paper we evaluate this reform by using a natural experiment created by the particular timing of 
the reform. Even if the principle of the reform was announced in the government agreement of 
October 2014, it had been hardly, if at all, discussed in press before its implementation. Moreover, the 
timing came as a complete surprise as the decision was communicated after a ministerial council on 
December 31, 2014 without having been announced as an item on the agenda. Hence, on January 1 
2015, job seekers aged 24 or older who had started their waiting period in 2014 were by surprise 
informed that they were no longer entitled to the activation allowance at the end of this one-year 
period, unlike younger age groups.  
 
Since in Belgium the average master student who graduates from university is slightly older than 24, 
the 2015 reform mostly affected these university graduates. We will therefore focus on this group in 
our empirical evaluation of the reform. Students can graduate from master programs in July (in case 
they succeed for all courses during the regular exam period) or in September (in case they failed some 
courses during the regular exam period and had to retake some courses in August/September).  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the entitlement trajectory to the activation allowance for students who after 
graduation from university in July 2014, registered as job seeker at the PES in August 2014 at the age 
of 23 (our control group) or at the age of 24 (our treatment group). For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that they did not immediately enter employment after graduation. The younger age group 
(Panel A) became eligible for the activation allowance if they were unemployed at the end of the one-
year waiting period in August 2015, conditional upon two successful evaluations of search effort. At 
the start of the waiting period, the older age group (Panel B) expected to be eligible for the activation 
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allowance as from August 2015 if unemployed. On January 1 2015, these job seekers were suddenly 
informed that they would no longer be eligible for this allowance after this period has elapsed.     
 
As a consequence of this reform, unemployed youths aged 24 or older were no longer required to 
attend the two interviews with a caseworker from the PES to provide proof of their job search effort. 
The suppression of the monitoring interviews could lead to behavioral reactions in the opposite 
direction than those expected with the prospect of being disqualified from the activation allowance. 
With our data, we are not able to disentangle these two effects. However, as mentioned in Section 
2.1, with only two evaluations of job search effort over a year, the Belgian monitoring scheme is 
lenient. Hence, its suppression has most likely a negligible impact on job search behavior in particular 
compared to the withdrawal of the entitlement to the activation allowance.5 This is consistent with 
the evidence in Cockx et al. (2018) about the impact of the monitoring of job-search effort in Belgium 
on unemployed people aged between 25 and 30.   
 
Figure 1: Trajectory of entitlement to the activation allowance (in month/year) 
 
Panel A: 23-year-old job seeker  
 
Graduate from  Job search 
monitoring 
                  
university                    
                              
 Register as      Job search 
monitoring 
              
 job seeker                    
                              
                              
7/14 8/14   1/15      8/15    8/16    8/17    8/18 
                              
   Waiting period Eligible for activation allowance   
 
Panel B: 24-year-old job seeker  
 
Graduate from Announcement                     
university of policy reform                    
                              
 Register as                          
 job seeker                          
                              
                              
7/14 8/14   1/15      8/15    8/16    8/17    8/18 
                              
   Waiting period Ineligible for activation allowance  
 
Notes: Trajectory of entitlement to the activation allowance for a 23- and 24-year-old job seeker. Age is measured at the 
moment of registration as a job seeker. 
 
The Belgian government did not only restrict access to the activation allowance for youths starting 
their waiting period after their 24th birthday, but also for high school dropouts. Starting from 
September 1 2015, school-leavers who do not successfully complete the sixth year of high school 
cannot claim the activation allowance before age 21. The aim of this reform was to encourage young 
                                                 
5 We can further argue that it is unlikely that there is any measurable effect of the suppression of job search monitoring at 
the first time horizon considered in our study, i.e. six months after registration as job seeker (unless treated job seekers 
anticipate this suppression by decreasing their search effort). This is because the first evaluation of job search activities would 
have taken place not earlier than in the seventh month of the waiting period and possibly later as a consequence of 
administrative delays.  
 7 
people to attain a high school degree, as this enhances their chances on the labor market. Since high 
school dropouts regain entitlement to the activation allowance from age 21 onwards, the reforms had 
more severe consequences for individuals leaving education at the age of 24 or older because they 
faced a permanent loss of the activation allowance. This is why we focus only on the policy reform for 
the older age group in this paper.6 
 
3. Data 
 
The empirical analysis is based on administrative grouped population data of recent university 
graduates who registered for the first time at the PES as unemployed job seekers between 2011 and 
2014. This data was readily provided by the regional PES of the two largest regions in Belgium: VDAB 
in Flanders and FOREM in Wallonia. The data are grouped by year of registration, period of registration 
within the year and age. Age is measured in years at the moment of registration at the PES. For privacy 
reasons, the data do not contain other characteristics of job seekers. 
 
Our first outcome of interest is the job finding rate measured 6, 12 and 18 months after registration. 
This (group-level) outcome is defined as the cumulative share of unemployed individuals who found a 
job within 6, 12 and 18 months. This outcome ignores transitions to very short employment spells that 
start and end within the same month, because a transition is counted only to the extent that the 
individual is still employed at the end of the month. To test whether the reform affected the transition 
to more durable employment or only to very short-term jobs, we also consider two alternative 
measures of job finding. Due to the different registration methods in the regional PES, we have to rely 
here on a different measure in each region. In Flanders we measure transitions to short-term jobs by 
the cumulative fraction of individuals that has been working under a temporary agency contract for 10 
days or more in at least one of the preceding 6, 12 or 18 months. Note that these jobs are registered 
only as from 2012. In Wallonia we measure the cumulative share of individuals transiting within the 
preceding 6, 12 or 18 months to a job that lasts at least one day.7  
 
Our second main outcome is the employment rate measured at the end of the 6th, 12th and 18th month 
after registration. This outcome is defined as the share of unemployed job seekers who are in 
employment at these moments. While the job finding rate allows us to evaluate whether or not the 
2015 reform has affected the transition to any job, the employment probability is used to test whether 
the reform contributed to employment stability. Employment is measured as in a cross section on the 
last day of the month. This means that longer employment spells are more likely observed than shorter 
ones.  
 
We measure the job finding and employment rates in the middle of and at the end of the waiting 
period (6 and 12 months after registration), and 6 months after its end, i.e. 18 months after 
registration. At this moment the unemployed graduates who were not affected by the reform could 
receive the benefit payments, while the affected group could no longer do so. Comparing employment 
and job finding rates of treated and non-treated labor market entrants measured 6 or 12 months after 
registration allows us to test whether these youths anticipate the future loss of entitlement to 
unemployment benefits. Comparing these outcomes after 18 months allows us to test whether, in 
addition to the anticipation effect, the actual loss of eligibility to unemployment benefits further 
affects employment. 
 
                                                 
6 See Cockx et al. (2019) for an evaluation of the policy reform affecting high school dropouts. 
7 In Wallonia, this second definition of job finding differs from the first one in that the latter includes self-employment and 
some cross-border work, while the second one does not. This explains that, although much less restrictive in the definition 
of the employment duration, the second job finding rate may be below the first one. 
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We have measurements of employment outcomes of job seekers registering at the PES in 2011-2013 
(pre-treatment period) and 2014 (post-treatment period). Since the decision to register as a job seeker 
might be influenced by the policy reform, we limit the post-reform period to job seekers who 
registered in 2014, before the announcement of the reform. Individuals registering as a job seeker in 
2014 can be affected by the reform only as from January 2015. The reform can therefore not influence 
the employment and job finding rates within 6 months after registration of the group who registered 
as unemployed job seeker in 2014 before July. Consequently, to study the impact of the policy change, 
we focus on the large subsample of university graduates who registered during the second half of the 
year. More precisely, given data availability, we focus on those who registered at the PES between 
June and October, which includes July and September, months in which most university students 
graduate.  
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
To estimate the causal impact of the policy change, we make use of the difference-in-differences 
approach and compare employment outcomes in the treatment group before and after the policy 
reform with employment outcomes at the same moments in the control group. 
 
Data limitations prevent us from delineating treatment and control groups perfectly. The treatment 
group consist of individuals who are in the waiting period for the activation allowance at the end of 
2014, but who, as a consequence of the reform, unexpectedly fail to meet the new eligibility criteria. 
By contrast, in the data we measure the labor outcomes of all individuals who registered in 2014 as 
unemployed job seeker at the PES: We cannot identify the sub-population for which the waiting period 
is ongoing at the end of 2014 because some job seekers could already have found a stable job before 
2015. Other job seekers could be back in education or out of the labor force at this moment. 
Consequently, not all job seekers in the treatment group are effectively treated. Furthermore, for a 
subgroup of the considered population the waiting period may already have expired before the end of 
2014, because we cannot exclude that some individuals, who registered at the PES for the first time in 
2014, started this period already in 2013. This concerns young people who immediately started 
working upon labor market entry - which counts for the waiting period. Focusing on job seekers who 
registered at the PES between June and October reduces the relative importance of this group. Finally, 
the minority who collects welfare benefits during this one-year period is not affected by the loss of 
entitlement to the activation allowance. Since we cannot exclude non-compliance for these reasons, 
the identified treatment effects must be interpreted as intention-to-treat effects. 
 
Since our sample consists of job seekers registering at the PES between June and October, in principle 
the period that job seekers were exposed to the policy change varies between zero and four months 
when considering employment outcomes measured 6 months after registration.8 However, because 
there is a rule that for youth graduating in June or July, the waiting period cannot begin before August 
1, the period of exposure to the policy ranges for the majority of the individuals between two and four 
months. Among the group of youths who registered for the first time as a job seeker between June 
and October 2014 in Wallonia, 41% did so in September (Forem, 2015). They were thus treated during 
a period of three months before our first outcome was measured. 
 
We estimate the policy impact within a linear probability model using ordinary least squares and 
Huber-White heteroskedastic robust standard errors. This is done by expanding the grouped data to 
the individual level using the number of individuals within each group (Angrist and Pischke, 2013, p. 
                                                 
8 For someone who registers at the PES in October 2014, this outcome is measured at the end of April 2015, i.e. 6 full months 
after registration and 4 months after the reform was announced on January 1 2015.  
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40).9 The difference-in-differences approach implies that the treatment effect can be estimated using 
the following specification for the linear probability model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑇2014 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, 
 
for 𝑡 ∈ {2011,… ,2014}, and where 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is a dummy equal to one if individual i, who registered at the 
PES during year t finds a (temp) job within 6, 12 or 18 months after registration (alternatively, is 
employed at the end of the 6th, 12th or 18th month). 𝐷𝑖 is an indicator equal to one if the job seeker 
is affected by the policy change. 𝑇2014 is an indicator equal to one if the individual registered at the 
PES in year 2014. 𝛿 is the difference-in-differences estimator of the impact of the reform on the 
outcome.   
 
This model controls for any potential time-constant difference between the employment outcomes of 
job seekers in the control group and the treatment group, captured by 𝛽, and time effects common to 
both, captured by 𝛾𝑡. Nonetheless, it rules out additional time effects that differ between the treated 
and control group in the absence of the reform. In particular, this model relies on the assumption that 
both groups would have followed a common trend in their employment outcomes if the reform had 
not taken place. Under this identifying assumption, the parameter 𝛿 captures any deviation from this 
common trend induced by the reform, that is, its causal effect. To formally assess the validity of our 
common trends assumption, we test whether the employment rate and job finding rate of the treated 
and control groups deviated from a common trend during the pre-treatment period 2011-2013. 
Therefore, we estimate a similar regression with interaction effects between the treatment group and 
year dummies in the pre-reform period. The parallel trends assumption is rejected if these interaction 
effects are jointly significantly different from zero. 
 
5. Results 
 
Figure 2 compares the job finding rates (panels A and B) and the employment rate (panel C) of 23- and 
24-year-old job seekers who registered at the PES with a master's degree between June and October. 
The outcomes are measured 6 months after the first registration as a job seeker. Table A1 in Appendix 
summarizes these outcomes at all three time horizons before and after the reform.  
 
In Figure 2, the year of registration is on the horizontal axis and outcomes are shown before (2011-
2013, and 2012-2013 for employment in temp job in Flanders) and after (2014) the policy reform. The 
thick solid line shows the observed job finding and employment rates for 24-year-old job seekers 
(treatment group). The thin solid line presents the counterfactual outcome of the treatment group in 
the absence of the policy reform. The counterfactual outcome is predicted by a difference-in-
differences model with interaction effects between the treatment group and time dummies for the 
pre- and post-reform periods. This outcome is obtained by setting these interaction effects to zero. 
The corresponding 95% confidence interval is computed from the standard errors of the interaction 
effects between time dummies and the treatment group. The counterfactual outcome is shifted to the 
level of the observed outcome of the treated in the year before the policy reform. By construction, the 
confidence interval is zero for this year (the reference one).  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Note that this expansion to the individual level is only possible because of the binary nature of our outcome variable. A 
referee raised that we should have ideally clustered standard errors by month of registration as to take seasonal effects into 
account. Unfortunately, there are no data available at this level of disaggregation. This means that the standard errors are 
presumably underestimated.  
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Figure 2: Job finding and employment rates (6 months after registration) 
Flanders Wallonia 
Panel A: Job finding rate (employed on the last day of the month) 
  
Panel B: Job finding rate (alternative outcomes) 
Employed in a temp job Employed at least 1 day 
  
Panel C: Employment rate 
  
Notes: Treatment group = 24-year-old job seekers. Control group = 23-year-old job seekers. Outcomes are measured 6 
months after registration at the PES for job seekers who register between June and October after having obtained a master's 
degree. The vertical line is drawn at the last period before the reform. The thick solid line shows the observed outcome of 
the treatment group. The fine solid line shows the counterfactual outcome of the treatment group in absence of the 
treatment. The thin dotted lines are the 95% confidence interval for the counterfactual path. 
 
 
The first panel shows the job finding rate when employment is measured only on the last day of the 
month. Before the policy reform approximately 75% (59%) of job seekers in the treatment group in 
Flanders (Wallonia) have transited at least once to a job. Comparing the observed outcomes of the 
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treated (thick solid line) with their counterfactual outcome in absence of the reform (thin solid line) 
provides a first assessment of the parallel trends assumption. From both graphs, we see that the 
observed outcome of the treatment group remains within the 95% confidence interval of their 
counterfactual outcome of the treatment group before the policy reform. This suggests that the 
parallel trends assumption is not rejected for both regions. In 2014, the year of registration where job 
seekers are affected by the policy reform, the observed outcome for the job finding rate is also similar 
to the counterfactual outcome of the treated and remains within the 95% confidence interval in both 
Flanders and Wallonia.  
 
Panel B shows our alternative measures for the job finding rate when employment is also measured if 
the individual did not work on the last day of the month. The first figure shows the job finding rate 
limited to temp jobs in Flanders. This outcome is observed only as from 2012. Before the policy reform, 
11% of job seekers in Flanders were at least once employed by a temporary agency within 6 months 
after registration. In 2014, the observed outcome of the treatment group just exceeds the upper bound 
of the 95% confidence interval. The next figure in panel B shows the job finding rate to jobs lasting at 
least one day in Wallonia. In contrast to the job finding rate in panel A, this outcome is more likely to 
capture very short-term employment. Although the observed outcome of the treated remains within 
the 95% confidence interval of the counterfactual outcome, this outcome approaches the upper bound 
of the confidence interval, suggesting a positive effect of the policy reform on this measure of the job 
finding rate.   
 
Panel C shows the employment rate or the fraction of job seekers who is employed 6 months after 
registration. Before the policy reform 69% (50%) of job seekers in the treatment group in Flanders 
(Wallonia) is employed 6 months after registration. As the observed employment rate of the treated 
remains within the 95% confidence interval both before and after the policy reform, these figures 
suggest that losing future eligibility to the activation allowance did not affect employment at the end 
of the sixth month. 
 
Figure A1 in the appendix is the analog to Figure 2 where all outcomes are measured 12 months after 
registration. Job finding and employment rates measured after 12 months are higher than after 6 
months, but the trends before and after the reform are similar. In Flanders (Wallonia), 17% (34%) of 
young labor market entrants in 2014 in the control group is not employed at the end of the 12th month, 
i.e. the scheduled end date of the waiting period. These figures give an upper bound of the benefit 
take-up rates among this population because we cannot exclude that some of these individuals were 
not actively looking for a job anymore. Finally, Figure A2 in Appendix shows the corresponding 
graphical analysis for the job finding and employment rates measured after 18 months. This allows us 
to test whether the actual loss of entitlement to UI affects employment in addition to the anticipation 
effect. The trends are similar as for the job finding and employment rate measured respectively 6 and 
12 months after registration. While there is no effect of the reform on the employment rate (panel C) 
and the job finding rate limited to jobs measured on the last day of the month (panel A), scrapping 
entitlement to UI has raised the job finding rate to temporary jobs (panel B). 
 
Table 4 presents the output of the difference-in-differences estimation for the job finding and 
employment rates within respectively 6, 12 and 18 months. We present only the coefficients of the 
treatment effects and the counterfactual outcomes of the treated in absence of the policy reform as 
predicted by our model. To test for parallel trends, we estimate placebo regressions for the difference-
in-differences model on the pre-reform period and include interaction effects between the treatment 
group and time dummies. The p-value of the F-test that the interaction effects are jointly insignificantly 
different from zero is reported in the Table. Based on these p-values, we can conclude that the parallel 
trends assumption is never rejected at the 5% and even 10% level.   
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The results in panel A of Table 4 suggest that the reform did not increase the job finding rate if jobs 
are measured on the last day of the month only. In contrast, panel B shows that losing future 
entitlement to UI significantly raised the fraction of youths who had a temporary job experience in 
Flanders. The fraction of youths who had at least one temp job has increased by 3.3 percentage points 
within 6 months after registration. In absence of the reform, 9.0% of job seekers would have found a 
temp job. This fraction increased to 12.3% because of the policy reform, a relative effect of 36.7%. The 
effects are similar when measured after 12 and 18 months. In Wallonia, we estimate a non-negligible 
positive effect for the job finding rate to jobs lasting at least one day after 6, 12 and 18 months. 
However, only the effect measured within 12 months is significant at the 10% level. The fact that 
treatment effects are similar when measured at the three different time horizons for the cumulative 
job finding rates implies that although job finding increased immediately after the announcement of 
the policy reform (outcomes measured after 6 months), there is no clear additional effect on job 
finding after the sixth month in the waiting period, or if there is, it cannot be measured with the given 
precision of our estimates. 
 
 
Table 4: Treatment effects on job finding and employment rates (difference-in-differences) 
 Flanders Wallonia 
 6 months 12 months 18 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 
 Panel A: Job finding rate (employed on the last day of the month) 
Treatment effect -0.013 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 0.006 0.012 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.023) (0.020) (0.017) 
Counterfactual probability 0.747 0.879 0.928 0.594 0.733 0.820 
Parallel trends: p-value 0.976 0.681 0.395 0.832 0.995 0.515 
Observations 12634 12634 12634 9728 9728 9728 
       
 Panel B: Job finding rate (alternative outcomes) 
 Employed in a temp job Employed at least 1 day 
Treatment effect 0.033** 0.038** 0.037** 0.032 0.037* 0.021 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) 
Counterfactual probability 0.090 0.121 0.137 0.566 0.700 0.776 
Parallel trends: p-value 0.699 0.893 0.954 0.765 0.661 0.998 
Observations 9639 9639 9639 9728 9728 9728 
       
 Panel C: Employment rate 
Treatment effect -0.015 0.002 -0.009 -0.010 0.004 0.004 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
Counterfactual probability 0.709 0.814 0.881 0.542 0.619 0.596 
Parallel trends: p-value 0.952 0.671 0.407 0.458 0.821 0.848 
Observations 12634 12634 12634 9728 9728 9728 
Notes: Treatment group = 24-year-old job seekers. Control group = 23-year-old job seekers. Age is measured at the moment 
of registration as a job seeker. Control period = 2011-2013 (2012-2013 for employment in temp jobs in Flanders), treatment 
period = 2014. Outcomes are measured for job seekers who register between June and October after having obtained a 
master’s degree. The counterfactual outcome is the predicted outcome for the treated in absence of the treatment in the 
post-reform period. To test for parallel trends, we estimate similar regressions with interaction effects between the treatment 
groups and year dummies. The parallel trends assumption is rejected if these interaction effects are jointly significantly 
different from zero in the pre-reform period. The p-value of the test is reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
As since January 2012, the activation allowance is time limited, we restrict the analysis to the job 
seekers registering as from 2012 in a robustness check. The results displayed in Table A2 in the 
appendix confirm our previous results. Moreover, the job finding rate to jobs lasting at least one day 
measured after 12 months in Wallonia now becomes significant at the 5% level.  
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How can we interpret these findings? Job search theory predicts that abolishing the entitlement to UI 
should enhance job search effort and reduce selectivity in the job acceptance behavior (Mortensen, 
1977 and van den Berg 1990). To the extent that the unemployed are forward looking, these effects 
should already be observed prior to the end of the waiting period, from the moment the unemployed 
are informed about the reform. Our results are qualitatively in line with this prediction. The prospect 
of losing entitlement has a clear positive effect on the fraction of graduate job seekers getting temp 
jobs in Flanders. This enhanced transition to temp jobs occurs well before the end of the waiting 
period, i.e. already 6 months after registration in unemployment. Effects of a similar order of 
magnitude are estimated in Wallonia on cumulative transitions to jobs lasting at least one day, 
although they are not as precisely estimated. When we consider discrete time job finding rates and 
employment probabilities at the end of the month, the effects are instead small and statistically not 
significantly different from zero in both regions. This suggests that the reform has only accelerated 
transitions to short-term jobs and this only for a small fraction of the targeted population.  
 
A plausible explanation of these findings is that non-stationary forces driven by dynamic selection or 
negative duration dependence are at work (Kolsrud et al., 2018). The first force causes the recent 
graduates who are most sensitive to financial incentives and employable in high quality jobs to leave 
unemployment before the moment at which the prospect of losing entitlement to UI could start to 
impact their behavior. This interpretation assumes that the population of young graduates is 
heterogeneous and that those who end up in long-term unemployment either do not react to financial 
incentives or, if they do, they have only opportunities for very short-term jobs. The second force 
applies also for homogeneous populations. In this case the sensitivity to monetary incentives and the 
quality of job opportunities decline with unemployment duration. Whichever explanation holds, they 
are both consistent with our findings of weak impact on job finding and enhanced transitions to short-
lived jobs. Moreover, these mechanisms can also explain why there is a declining profile in the 
treatment effect in Panel B of Table 4: as compared to the effect measured at 6 months, there is a 
weak additional effect at 12 months and no supplementary one when the loss of eligibility becomes 
real. It is possible that as from these moments onwards all individuals who are sensitive to financial 
incentives have already left unemployment or that this sensitivity has further declined close to a zero 
level.  
 
Significant effects being exclusively measured for the transitions to short-term jobs suggest that these 
behavioral reactions come from liquidity constrained individuals who become less selective in their job 
acceptance behavior. If so, this would imply that the reform has induced an efficiency cost in terms of 
foregoing consumption smoothing gains (Chetty, 2008; Card et al. 2007). However, in any event the 
share of these liquidity constrained individuals is small and it is not clear to what extent a similar 
efficiency cost also applies for the majority for whom we do not observe such reaction. For instance, 
it is possible that parents absorb the income loss that the reform imposes on their children. This could 
also explain the absence of a reaction for this group.  
 
Our finding that there is no ex-post effect of actually losing benefit eligibility is in line with Bargain and 
Doorley (2011). They study in a regression discontinuity design the impact on the employment rate of 
the eligibility for a means-tested minimum income as from age 25 in France for childless single men. 
They find modest employment responses for high school dropouts and zero effects for higher 
educated. However, the latter result is not driven by a lower sensitivity to financial incentives but 
arguably because graduate men have higher earnings potential and, hence, are less affected by the 
eligibility for the means-tested benefit. In contrast, von Buxhoeveden (2019) shows for Sweden that 
the employment hazard significantly decreases once high school leavers become entitled to UI after a 
waiting period which partly depends on age. Also, Bolhaar et al. (2019) find that imposing a job search 
period before the entitlement to means-tested welfare benefits in the Netherlands substantially 
increases the likelihood to find a full-time job and reduces the benefits take-up rate. A possible 
explanation for the relatively important effects in the last two studies is that the first study includes 
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relatively short waiting periods and the latter an introduction of such a period. In both cases, incentives 
kick in before individuals highly sensitive to monetary incentives have left unemployment. However, 
the fact that Bolhaar et al. (2019) consider only individuals with very limited financial resources could 
also explain why they find larger effects than in our paper. 
 
Finally, our results also imply that temp jobs appear not be ‘stepping stones’ to more stable jobs. This 
is in line with the study of Givord and Wilner (2015). They conclude (p. 787) that “although fixed-term 
contracts may provide a ‘stepping-stone’ to permanent positions, temporary agency work is hardly 
better than unemployment in this regard”. Autor and Houseman (2010) and, more recently, van der 
Klaauw and Ziegler (2019) also find that temp jobs do not serve as stepping stones towards regular 
employment or better paying jobs. Our findings are also consistent with those of Cockx and Van Belle 
(2019) who found that extending the waiting period of the activation allowance from 9 to 12 months 
for graduates of a master’s degree did not significantly affect the discrete time transition to 
employment measured in a very similar way as in this study, while it appears to have reduced the 
number of working days and earnings. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has evaluated the impact on the transition to work of a policy reform that restricted the 
access of young labor market entrants to a particular unemployment benefit (UB) scheme. Under 
certain conditions these youths could claim unemployment benefits after a waiting period of one year. 
As of 2015, the Belgian government unexpectedly scrapped entitlement to these benefits for youths 
who start the waiting period at the age of 24 or older. The reform implied a change from an inclining 
to a flat rate (zero) benefit profile for individuals leaving education at these ages.  
 
Based on grouped data of university graduates aged 23 and 24 at the start of unemployment we used 
a difference-in-differences approach to find an answer to our research question. Our main finding is 
that scrapping the entitlement to UB of young labor market entrants only stimulated the transitions to 
very short-term jobs. The transitions to longer-lasting jobs remained unaffected. We argued that these 
findings are in particular consistent with those of Kolsrud et al. (2018) for the regular UI scheme in 
Sweden, namely that the behavioral reaction to changes in the benefit generosity is smaller for long-
term than for short-term unemployed. The zero-benefit level during the one-year waiting period likely 
induced the youths most sensitive to monetary incentives to leave unemployment prior to the moment 
that the anticipation of the loss of the UI entitlement could start to bite. 
 
The observed increase in the fraction of treated youths who found a short-lived job could be the result 
of liquidity constrained youths who became less selective in their job acceptance behavior. For them, 
scrapping entitlement to UI may have induced an efficiency cost in terms of forgoing consumption 
smoothing gains (Chetty, 2008). However, only 3 to 4 % of all university graduates who were intendedly 
treated youths were incentivized to accept a short-term work experience. This suggests the share of 
liquidity constrained individuals is small among graduates. Moreover, an alternative reason of why we 
do not find any behavioral effects for a large share of the population is that parents might have 
absorbed the income loss that the reform has generated for their children. Therefore, our findings do 
not necessarily imply that restoring the inclining UI benefit profile would be a policy to recommend, 
because it might also provide insurance to a group that is not at all liquidity constrained. Unfortunately, 
our data do not allow to identify to what extent the latter hypothesis holds or not.  
 
There are two further limitations of our study. First the results should be interpreted as intent-to-treat 
estimates and, hence, as lower bounds of the actual treatment effects. This is because we cannot 
identify those who were still at risk of losing their entitlement to UB at the moment the reform was 
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announced. Second we only had access to grouped data and to a limited set of outcome variables. 
Consequently, we could neither analyze treatment heterogeneity, nor investigate to what extent the 
reform pushed these youths into poverty or affected other dimensions of job quality than duration. 
An avenue of future research is therefore to address these limitations by collecting new data.  
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8. Appendix 
 
Table A1: Job finding and employment rates 
 Pre-reform period Post-reform period 
 Age 23 Age 24 Age 23 Age 24 
Flanders     
Job finding rate: Employed on the last day of the month   
after 6 months 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.73 
after 12 months 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.88 
after 18 months  0.93 0.92 0.94 0.93 
No. of individuals 5541 3748 1979 1366 
     
Job finding rate: Alternative outcomes (Employed in a temp job)   
after 6 months 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.12 
after 12 months 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.16 
after 18 months  0.16 0.16 0.14 0.17 
No. of individuals 3723 2571 1979 1366 
     
Employment rate     
after 6 months 0.72 0.69 0.73 0.69 
after 12 months 0.80 0.78 0.83 0.82 
after 18 months  0.87 0.85 0.90 0.87 
No. of individuals 5541 3748 1979 1366 
     
Wallonia     
Job finding rate: Employed on the last day of the month   
after 6 months 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.59 
after 12 months 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.74 
after 18 months  0.87 0.86 0.83 0.83 
No. of individuals 3898 3253 1366 1211 
     
Job finding rate: Alternative outcomes (Employed at least 1 day)   
after 6 months 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.60 
after 12 months 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.74 
after 18 months  0.79 0.77 0.79 0.80 
No. of individuals 3898 3253 1366 1211 
     
Employment rate     
after 6 months 0.53 0.50 0.57 0.53 
after 12 months 0.63 0.59 0.66 0.62 
after 18 months  0.72 0.70 0.62 0.60 
No. of individuals 3898 3253 1366 1211 
Notes: Average outcomes for 23- and 24-year-old job seekers with a master's degree, registering between June and October. 
Pre-reform period = 2011-2013 (2012-2013 for employment in temp jobs in Flanders), post-reform period = 2014. Outcomes 
for the job finding rate to temp jobs in Flanders are limited to the period 2012-2014. Age is measured at the moment of 
registration as a job seeker. Individuals registering at the age of 24 were not eligible anymore for the activation allowance 
after the reform. Individuals registering at the age of 23 can still claim the activation allowance. The employment and job 
finding rates are measured within 6, 12 and 18 months after the month of registration. For both regions, the first and third 
outcome includes self-employment, while this second one does not. 
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Figure A1: Job finding and employment rates (12 months after registration) 
Flanders Wallonia 
Panel A: Job finding rate (employed on the last day of the month) 
  
Panel B: Job finding rate (alternative outcomes) 
Employed in a temp job Employed at least 1 day 
  
Panel C: Employment rate 
  
Notes: Treatment group = 24-year-old job seekers. Control group = 23-year-old job seekers. Outcomes are measured 12 
months after registration at the PES for job seekers who register between June and October after having obtained a master's 
degree. The vertical line is drawn at the last period before the reform. The thick solid line shows the observed outcome of 
the treatment group. The fine solid line shows the counterfactual outcome of the treatment group in absence of the 
treatment. The thin dotted lines are the 95% confidence interval for the counterfactual path. 
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Figure A2: Job finding and employment rates (18 months after registration) 
Flanders Wallonia 
Panel A: Job finding rate (employed on the last day of the month) 
  
Panel B: Job finding rate (alternative outcomes) 
Employed in a temp job Employed at least 1 day 
  
Panel C: Employment rate 
  
Notes: Treatment group = 24-year-old job seekers. Control group = 23-year-old job seekers. Outcomes are measured 12 
months after registration at the PES for job seekers who register between June and October after having obtained a master's 
degree. The vertical line is drawn at the last period before the reform. The thick solid line shows the observed outcome of 
the treatment group. The fine solid line shows the counterfactual outcome of the treatment group in absence of the 
treatment. The thin dotted lines are the 95% confidence interval for the counterfactual path. 
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Table A2: Treatment effects on job finding and employment rates (difference-in-differences, no 2011) 
 Flanders Wallonia 
 6 months 12 months 18 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 
 Panel A: Job finding rate (employed on the last day of the month) 
Treatment effect -0.014 0.002 -0.003 -0.007 0.006 0.016 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) 
Counterfactual probability 0.748 0.877 0.929 0.593 0.733 0.815 
Parallel trends: p-value 0.880 0.545 0.203 0.546 0.946 0.412 
Observations 9639 9639 9639 7432 7432 7432 
       
 Panel B: Job finding rate (alternative outcomes) 
 Employed in a temp job Employed at least 1 day 
Treatment effect 0.033** 0.038** 0.037** 0.036 0.044** 0.020 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020) 
Counterfactual probability 0.090 0.121 0.137 0.562 0.694 0.777 
Parallel trends: p-value 0.699 0.893 0.954 0.600 0.815 0.958 
Observations 9639 9639 9639 7432 7432 7432 
       
 Panel C: Employment rate 
Treatment effect -0.017 0.003 -0.007 -0.004 0.008 0.002 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
Counterfactual probability 0.711 0.813 0.880 0.536 0.615 0.599 
Parallel trends: p-value 0.936 0.381 0.189 0.316 0.667 0.638 
Observations 9639 9639 9639 7432 7432 7432 
Notes: Treatment group = 24-year-old job seekers. Control group = 23-year-old job seekers. Age is measured at the moment 
of registration as a job seeker. Control period = 2012-2013, treatment period = 2014. Outcomes are measured for job seekers 
who register between June and October after having obtained a master’s degree. The counterfactual outcome is the 
predicted outcome for the treated in absence of the treatment in the post-reform period. To test for parallel trends, we 
estimate similar regressions with interaction effects between the treatment groups and year dummies. The parallel trends 
assumption is rejected if these interaction effects are jointly significantly different from zero in the pre-reform period. The p-
value of the test is reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
